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Abstract— Suspected budgetary participation is not 
always linear effect on budgetary slack. This is because 
the information asymmetry factor, and self esteem. This 
study aims to determine whether the asymmetry of 
information and self-esteem able to moderate Effect of 
participatory budgeting and budgetary slack. The number 
of samples in the study were 100 echelons SKPD South 
Sulawesi Provincial Government selected based on 
purposive sampling method. The data analysis technique 
used is moderation regression analysis (MRA). The 
results obtained are variable participatory budgeting has 
a positive effect on budgetary slack. Variable self esteem 
weaken the influence of participatory budgeting in the 
budgetary slack, while strengthening the influence of 
information asymmetry variable participatory budgeting 
in the budgetary slack. 
Keywords— budgetary Slack, Participatory Budgeting, 
Self Esteem, Asymmetry Information. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Regional autonomy was established, South 
Sulawesi provincial government is required to realize 
good governance. Local governments use performance-
based budgeting system which is the process efficient and 
participatory development, and the use of performance as 
a benchmark in the achievement of local budgets. 
However, the assessment of the performance of 
motivating agents to undertake budgetary slack for the 
sake of a better career in the future (Suartana, 2010). In 
addition, the budgetary slack is also common in the 
planning and preparation phase of the local budget, 
because it is dominated by the interests of the executive 
and legislative branches, and less reflective of the needs 
of society (Kartiwa, 2004). Budgetary slack will result in 
misallocation of resources and bias in the evaluation of 
the performance of agents on accountability unit 
(Suartana, 2010).  
For the Government of South Sulawesi province, 
based on budget data past five years, as a whole has not 
shown indications of an increase in performance and a 
significant performance improvement in its 
implementation as described in the table below: 
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Table.1: Budget and Realization of Local Revenue and Expenditure strip Povinsi South SulawesiFiscal year 2011 -2015 (in 
millions of rupiah) 
Year Fiscalrevenue 
 (Rp) 
RealizationRe
venue 
 (Rp) 
Percentag
e of 
achieveme
nt 
 (% ) 
Budget 
Expenditure 
(Rp) 
Actual 
Expenditure 
(Rp) 
Percentag
e of 
achieveme
nt 
 (% ) 
2011 3.106.899,564 3.110.566,841 100,11 2.703.727,485 2.548.690,795 94,19 
2012 4.665.214,439 4.433.963,019 95,40 3.569.468,407 3.388.137,989 94,92 
2013 4.996.499,327 4.867.592,611 97,42 4.438.230,501 4.081.099,922 91,95 
2014 5.650.575,561 5.503.161,406 97,39 4.981.103,824 4.499.032,192 90,32 
2015 6.445.779,161 6.105.815,095 94,72 5.350.327,153 4.973.655,476 92,95 
Source: Regional Financial Management Board of South Sulawesi Province, 2017 
 
Table 1 shows, the number of budgeted 
expenditure to finance programs / activities indicate that 
the budget plan set by the realization there is failure in 
activity budget. It is seen from the difference between 
budget and actual spending tends to an excess of the 
budget, it shows in budgeting is not in accordance with 
applicable regulations and indicated their programs / 
activities that have not been fully implemented and there 
tends to be an indication of budgetaru slack. 
In addition to the above phenomenon there are 
few previous studies have examined the effect of 
participatory budget in budgetary slack declared 
inconsistent results, among others Merchant (1981), 
Young (1985), Fredderick J. DeMicco, Steven J, and 
Dempsy (19980, Little, et al., (2002) Vincent K, Chong, 
Kar Ming Chong (2002), Yuhertiana (2004), Hafsah 
(2005), Falikhatun (2007), Sudarba (2010), Andriyani and 
Hidayati (2010), Andry Arifin Rahman (2012), Nila 
Aprila and Selvi Hardiyani (2012), Widiyastuti (2014) 
Zahirul Haque and Peter Brosnan (2015), ,  states that a 
high participatory budgeting led to budgetary slack. 
Unlike the case with Schift and Lewin (1970), Onsi 
(1973), Dunk (1993), Minan (2005), Adam S, Maiga and 
Fred A. Jacobs (2007), Supanto (2010), Martjin and 
Wiersma (2011), Lislie Kren and Adam S.Maiga (2015), 
Laura Francis-Gladney, Robert B. Welker and Nace 
Magner (2015) that the participatory budgeting can lower 
the occurrence of budgetary slack. Based on data from 
South Sulawesi Provincial Budgets and inconsistency of 
these results, the researchers were motivated to examine 
the effect of participatory budgeting to budgetary slack 
with asymmetry informationand self esteem as a 
moderating variable at Work Unit (SKPD) South 
Sulawesi province. 
 
II. OBJECTIVES 
The questions that guide the investigation are: 
how is the moderation of information asymmetry and self 
esteem on participatory budgetary relationships and 
budgetary slack? Therefore, this study aims to explore a 
new conceptual model that can fill the research gap 
between Participatory budgeting in pressing the budgetary 
slack centered on Moderation of Information Asymmetry 
and Self Esteem. 
 
III. THEORETICAL-CONCEPTUAL REVIEW 
3.1 Participatory Budget and budgetary Slack  
Based on agency theory, participatory budget is a 
process of cooperation between agents and principals in 
making decisions related to budgeting. The regional 
budget prepared by the executive as agent and authorized 
by the legislature as a principal. Meaning of participatory 
local governance is SKPD involvement in budgeting. 
Head SKPD have the opportunity to submit proposals 
related to the implementation of the Work Plan (RKPD) 
as a reference in preparing the Work Plan Budget (RKA-
SKPD). RKA-SKPD a participatory budget documents in 
local government are internally related to the 
determination of budget allocation and performance 
targets in the next proposed budget into the budget 
(Abdullah, 2012). However, the performance-based 
budget system could be expected to lead to budgetary 
slack. Budgetary slack is degrading acts as agent 
productivity capabilities through participation in 
budgeting have a chance to determine his standards 
(Young, 1985). Based on the above, it can be 
hypothesized:  
H1: Participatory Budget affects the budgetary slack.  
3.2 Participatory budget, budgetary Slack and 
Information Asymmetry  
Based on the assumption of agency theory, 
humans will act opportunistic namely a personal interest 
rather than the interests of the organization. The principal 
can not monitor agent activity every day. Instead, agents 
learn of material information related to the capacity to 
work, work environment and organizational units. This 
has caused the asymmetry of information between 
principals and agents who participate in local budgeting. 
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This is supported by Young (1985), Utomo (2006), 
Djasuli and Fadilah (2011) that the interaction of 
participatory budgeting and information asymmetry 
positive and significant impact on budgetary slack. 
According to Anthony and Govindarajan (2001) in 
Falikhatun (2007), the executive agency tends to perform 
budgetary slack to secure his position in the government. 
Meanwhile, as the principal legislative 5 tend to make 
false contract with the executive. However, Dunk (1993) 
states that if a positive communication between the agent 
and the principal case, then the budgetary slack will 
diminish. Based on these descriptions, it can be 
hypothesized:  
H2: Asymmetry of information moderating influence on 
budgetary slack participatory budgeting.  
3.3 Participatory budget, budgetary Slack, and Self 
Esteem  
Kreitner & Kinicki (2003) states that a person 
who has high self esteem tend to think of themselves 
more than others. Therefore self esteem is able to weaken 
the influence of participatory budgeting in the budgetary 
slack, because if a person feels himself so important, 
valuable and influential then raised the confidence that 
what he does will succeed and create optimal results. 
Conversely, a low Self Esteem means an employee then 
the resulting incredulity himself that what he did will not 
be successful and produce results that are not optimal and 
tend to perform budgetary slack. This is supported by 
Nouri and Parker (1996). Ikhsan and Ane (2007) states 
that budgetary slack able to moderate the effect of the 
participatory budget in budgetary slack. Similarly 
Desmiyati (2009) that the interaction of participatory 
budgeting and self esteem and no significant negative 
effect on the budgetary slack. However, Kreitner & 
Kinicki (2003) states that self-esteem can not moderate 
influence on budgetary slack participatory budgeting. 
Based on the foregoing, it can be hypothesized:  
H3: Self Esteem participatory budgeting moderating 
influence on budgetary slack. 
Based on the above it can be presented this  study design 
in Figure 1 below : 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The study design in Figure 1 above describe the influence of independent variables, Budgeting participatory (X1) on 
the dependent variable is the budgetary slack (Y) with asymmetric information (X2), Self esteem (X3) as a moderating 
variable. 
 
IV. METHODOLOGY 
The research will be conducted in the regional 
work units (SKPD) South Sulawesi province. This 
research took place in May-July, 2017, because the local 
government will submit the Public Policy budget year 
2017 budget by mid-June 2017. The population in this 
study is structurally composed of officials of Echelon II, 
III, and IV are still active duty until the month July 2017, 
amounting to 476 people. Samples are structural officials 
who participate in local budgeting. The sampling 
technique used purposive sampling. Criteria for this 
sample is Echelon II / III / IV (head of the agency / 
department head / chief / head office / head subpart / 
secretary of the regional committee) who participate 
directly participate in the budgeting process. These 
criteria are used to avoid sampling error, because not all 
echelons participate in budgeting.  
Based on these criteria obtained 105 respondents 
as samples. Methods of data collection using a 
questionnaire survey, a list of written statements related to 
the research variables. Therefore, this study used a 
questionnaire then test instrument (validity and reliability) 
is performed. Answers from respondents who had 
accumulated (ordinal data) then tabulated and transformed 
into interval data. As a condition to meet the regression 
test, the classic assumption test (test for normality and 
ParticipatoryBudg
eting (X1) 
Budgetary Slack 
(Y) 
Asymmetry 
Information (X2) 
Self  
Esteem (X3) 
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heteroscedasticity) done first. Analysis of the data to test 
the hypothesis using 
MRA(ModeratedRegressionAnalysis). 
 
V. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The questionnaire was distributed in this research 
were 105 questionnaires and 105 questionnaires were 
returned (Response Rate = 100%). There are 5 
questionnaires were aborted because the contents were 
not complete, so overall there are 100 eligible 
questionnaires for analysis (Usable Response Rate = 
92.7%).  
Correlation coefficient entire instrument above 
0.30, which means the entire instrument is declared 
invalid. Overall instruments have also been reliable with 
cronbanch's alpha value for each variable of participatory 
budgeting, information asymmetry, self esteem, and 
budgetary slack is equal to 0.744, 0.892, 0.655, 0.871. 
Normality test results showed that the regression model 
has a normal distribution of data with Asymp value. Sig. 
(2-tailed) of 0.423. This model is also free of problems 
heteroskedastisitas with significant value variable 
participatory budgeting, budgetary slack, asymmetry of 
information, and self-esteem respectively 0.595, 0.060, 
0.457, 0.077, 0.343 and the significant value of 
participatory budgeting interaction with information 
asymmetry and self esteem consecutive succession of 
0.089, 0.824.  
Results Moderated Regression Analysis (MRA) can be seen in Table 2 
 
Table.2:  Moderated Regression Analysis 
Variabel Unstandardized 
Cofficien B 
Sig. 
(Constant) 
PA 
AI 
SE 
PA*AI 
PA*SE 
-34,916 
3,428 
1,025 
0,689 
-0,065 
-0,059 
0,002 
0,000 
0,001 
0,005 
0,031 
Adjusted (R2) 0,610  
Sing F 0,00  
 
Table 2 Adjusted R Square value of 0.610. This 
value meaning that 61 percent of the variation changes in 
budgetary slack capable explained by participatory 
budgeting, information asymmetry and self-esteem. In 
Table 2, the significant value of 0,000 F is less than 0.05 
means that the model where the value of this research 
have been worth test. 
Results of testing the first hypothesis (H1) 
indicates bahw.a participatory budgeting affect budgetary 
slack. The regression coefficient is worth 3.428 indicates 
that participatory budgeting has a positive effect on 
budgetary slack. This shows that more and more 
individuals who participate in the budgeting, the higher 
the chances of budgetary slack.  
Asymmetry of information strengthens 
participatory budgeting influence on budgetary slack 
formulated in the second hypothesis (H2). This occurs 
because the beta value having the opposite direction with 
the hypothesis that a negative value of -0.065. Based on 
this, the information asymmetry is not able to strengthen 
the influence of participatory budgeting in the budgetary 
slack. This is caused by the possibility of asymmetry of 
information in public sector organizations are very small 
because thereRegulations, duty, and authority (Falikhatun, 
2007). 
The third hypothesis (H3), which is able to 
moderate the influence of self esteem participatory 
budgeting in the budgetary slack. The regression 
coefficient indicates that the variable-value -0.059 self 
esteem weaken the influence of participatory budgeting in 
the budgetary slack. If self-esteem is owned by 
individuals who participated in a high budget, then the 
possibility of budgetary slack will decline. Kreitner & 
Kinicki (2003) states that a person who has high self 
esteem tend consider themselves more than others. 
Therefore self esteem is able to weaken the influence of 
participatory budgeting in the budgetary slack, because if 
a person feels himself so important, valuable and 
influential then raised the confidence that what he does 
will succeed and create optimal results. 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the analysis and discussion before it 
can be concluded that Participatory Budgeting has a 
positive effect on budgetary slack, as well as strengthen 
the influence of information asymmetry. This means that 
in order to reduce the asymmetry of information should 
South Sulawesi Province, local officials can apply the 
disclosure of information related to the budgeting 
(budget) in the province of South Sulawesi. The local 
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governments can use information media with the 
maximum and can be accounted for, even provide a 
contact person from the officials concerned. Instead, Self 
Esteem weaken the influence of participatory budgeting 
in the budgetary slack.  
Suggestions for further research are able to use 
the bureaucratic ethics, culture of the Organization, 
individual characteristics, locus of control, motivation in 
moderating influence on budgetary slack participatory 
budget.  
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